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Abstract
Pay-for-performance (P4P) is the provision of financial incentives to healthcare providers based on pre-specified 
performance targets. P4P has been used as a policy tool to improve healthcare provision globally. However, 
researchers tend to cluster into those working on high or low- and middle-income countries (LMICs), with still 
limited knowledge exchange, potentially constraining opportunities for learning from across income settings. 
We reflect here on some commonalities and differences in the design of P4P schemes, research questions, 
methods and data across income settings. We highlight how a global perspective on knowledge synthesis could 
lead to innovations and further knowledge advancement.
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Pay-for-performance (P4P), or the provision of financial incentives to healthcare providers based on pre-specified performance targets, first emerged as 
a strategy to improve quality of care in the United States, 
Europe, and other high-income countries (HICs), and was 
subsequently adopted in low- and middle-income countries 
(LMICs) with the further aim of increasing service coverage.1,2 
While this approach to provider payment is now a global 
phenomenon, the community of health economists and health 
service researchers working on P4P tends to divide into those 
concentrating on HICs, and those concentrating on LMICs. 
Literature reviews on the topic also tend to focus on one of 
these settings.1-8 To date, little effort has been made to look at 
the global evidence on P4P, including the research questions, 
methods and types of data used to study P4P, the research 
findings, and how and why these vary across income settings. 
Most importantly, there has been little reflection on whether 
there is variation in the use of P4P as a policy intervention, 
and on its effectiveness and mechanisms of effect in HICs 
compared to LMICs. This lack of connection between the two 
groups of researchers and their research agendas may present 
a missed opportunity to improve research methods and gain 
a common understanding of where, why and under which 
circumstances P4P may work. 
From our contributions to recent academic conferences 
and policy debates, and from our collective knowledge of the 
literature, we have identified a number of issues related to P4P 
currently studied in different settings and for which a global 
perspective could bring new insights. These include the 
specifics of incentive design, mechanisms of effect, spillover 
effects, context moderators, and sustainability of P4P over 
time. In addition, there are important differences in the 
way that research is undertaken, including research design, 
methods and data used. And finally, there are key areas where 
deliberately comparative research that sets out to study these 
topics across high and low-income settings, could potentially 
lead to innovations and knowledge advancement. We review 
differences in research questions, research design, methods 
and data used to highlight where researchers could reflect on 
adopting research elements used from colleagues working in 
other settings to innovate, generate new knowledge and create 
a common ground for cross-learning. 
The Specifics of Incentive Design
The majority of research so far has focused on understanding 
the effect of P4P on healthcare delivery and health outcomes.1-8 
What is lacking in both settings, is a better understanding 
of the design features that contribute to, or undermine, 
the effectiveness of P4P with respect to their objectives.9,10 
Indeed, few recent studies investigate and highlight the 
relevance of incentive design elements that enabled P4P 
to achieve intended outcomes, and its potential spillovers 
to non-incentivised service areas.11-13 In both settings, 
there is a need for a deeper and broader understanding of 
the interplay between design and context that determines 
programme effects and their sustainability over time. A clear 
description of the design in relation to pre-defined typologies 
would be a first research element that could facilitate cross 
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settings analysis,9,10 including understanding how the context 
shapes policy objectives and design and how these broadly 
differ across settings. Differences in objectives and design 
will inevitably shape the way research is done, especially 
considering that in LMIC P4P may have been implemented 
with the view to reform the overall healthcare system.10,14
Mechanisms and Spillovers
Understanding the mechanisms through which P4P operates 
is also important to answer questions on the appropriate 
use of P4P schemes.15-17 Key questions include when and for 
which policy objectives P4P schemes can be applied, as well 
as which design features can be chosen by policy-makers to 
obtain long-term, sustainable changes. For example, schemes 
may be associated with improvements in care processes 
and care use, but not associated with improved health 
outcomes.5,18,19 They can also be associated with changes in 
incentivised processes and outcomes, including for example 
diversion away from incentivized tasks or improvement 
of performance on complementary tasks.20 There is also a 
risk of unintended performance reduction when incentives 
are reduced or removed.21 Understanding why and when 
this happens, and if it is a consequence of scheme design 
or implementation,22,23 can help to determine whether 
incentives can be used temporarily as a way to prompt long-
term behavioural changes, or whether a sustained increase in 
funding is needed.24 And again the answers may be different 
in HIC or LMIC, where health services are more severely 
underfunded. 
Context 
Context strongly influences not only the implementation 
process, but also the way schemes are designed, in terms of 
the political actors involved in its conception, the overall 
aims and the focus of target setting. In England and Scotland, 
for instance, P4P was introduced by the National Health 
Service, with the objective of improving the quality of either 
primary or secondary care provided to patients, or patients 
with specific conditions.12 In contrast, in LMICs, most 
schemes have been driven and funded by international aid 
and reflect the priorities of donors, as well as those of the 
recipient government, often with a shift from input to output 
based financing.9 Although adapted to local circumstances,25 
funding and targets are concentrated on selected healthcare 
indicators with high priority in the international agenda, with 
the primary objective of increasing access to care and making 
healthcare purchasing more strategic.26,27 The setting also 
affects performance. Even within the same setting, providers 
exposed to different contextual factors appear to achieve 
different levels of performance, at least in the short term.28,29
In low- and middle-income settings, where absolute levels 
of health spending are much lower and international aid may 
represent a high share of the total spending, P4P funding 
can be crucial to the functioning of the healthcare system. 
The bonus payments received are often either re-invested in 
supporting the current expenditure of the healthcare provider, 
and/or paid directly to health workers to augment their 
remuneration,30,31 or serve as an effective salary payment. In 
high-income settings health workers rarely benefit directly 
from any performance related payments. This difference 
could influence how providers respond to incentives and to 
additional payments, or their removal. For example in low-
income settings, the removal of bonus payments may lead 
to a drop in service provision (ie, increased absenteeism),32 
whereas in better funded systems this may only affect the 
sustainability of process improvements.22
Research Focus and Design
Differences in the nature of health systems and in the reasons 
for introducing P4P between HIC and LMIC have had some 
influence over the focus and design of the research. For 
example, in HIC questions about the sustainability of the 
effects of P4P over the longer term have been explored more 
extensively, possibly due to the longer history of implementing 
P4P and more consolidated routine information systems.33-35 
In contrast, in LMICs where experience with P4P is more 
recent and information systems are weaker, effects have 
typically been assessed at one point in time within impact 
evaluation studies, with only some consideration of the 
longer term financial sustainability of these schemes, which 
are initially dependent on donor funding.8,9,36,37
Furthermore, P4P schemes implemented in low- and 
middle-income settings are often set up as part of a bundle 
of interventions to reform the health system, through 
strengthening health information systems, enhancing provider 
autonomy, and promoting greater financial decentralisation.9,38 
As a result some of the LMIC research has sought to examine 
the interactions between P4P and the broader health system 
building blocks involved in the achievement of these 
targets.15-17,39 However, in HIC P4P does not typically require 
broader reforms to the health system, and hence system level 
effects of P4P are less commonly studied. In England, for 
example, the interaction between P4P schemes and the way 
public funding is managed (ie, how budgets are allocated to 
different sectors and public institutions, and then executed 
to deliver services) has rarely been examined. For example, 
rigid centralised financial management and procurement can 
act as a barrier to budget execution and service delivery.27 
In high-income settings where P4P is implemented in the 
public sector, the centralised public finance management is 
not considered by P4P researchers, perhaps because it does 
not represent a constraint. Both LMIC and HIC studies would 
benefit from considering the wider financing architecture 
within which P4P is embedded and the effect this has on 
programme success.38
In both low- and high-income settings, existing research 
has not systematically accounted for the interplay between 
P4P and other policies, and between P4P payments and the 
allocation of other sources of funding for providers, even if 
these have been shown to exist.27 In particular, the opportunity 
costs of financing these schemes is often not considered. The 
assessment of the cost-effectiveness of P4P, as well as other 
health policies and health system interventions, is still in 
its infancy in both settings, with potentially controversial 
assumptions and methods needing refinement, but remains 
crucial.8,36,40-42 The assessment of whether programme benefits 
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are concentrated in certain population groups has been 
explored more extensively by researchers in HIC43-45 and 
there are growing numbers of studies examining this issue 
in LMIC,28,46 but more evidence could be helpful to address 
potential equity concerns.47 
Research Methods and Data 
The methods and data used to support P4P research has also 
differed between high- and low-income settings. In low- and 
middle-income settings research often relies on the use of 
mixed methods and includes careful process evaluations.24,27 
This is perhaps a response to the need to understand not only 
the context, and the interaction between P4P schemes and 
the healthcare and public services system as a whole, but also 
how to set up data collection. In high-income settings where 
information systems are more structured and consolidated, 
single methods analyses are more common. 
In low- and middle-income settings routine healthcare data 
is often weak, with missing data and incomplete time series. 
Therefore, impact evaluations are more likely to be based 
on randomised control or quasi-experimental studies, with 
significant primary data collection. This facilitates analysis of 
the impact of P4P on a wide range of effects as hypothesized 
in a programme theory of change, including an assessment 
of potential mediators of programme effect. In contrast, in 
high-income settings, routine data systems support rigorous 
observational studies measuring impacts on a more limited 
range of outcomes over a longer period of time.48 Research 
informed by routine data may overlook effects on important 
outcomes that are not available in administrative systems.
The Value of Taking a Global Perspective 
Every healthcare system is different. These differences will 
inevitably shape both the goals, design and implementation 
of P4P schemes as well as the research that is undertaken. 
However, there is value in looking across settings both at 
policy experience, research methods and findings to improve 
our understanding of which interventions, such as P4P, may 
strengthen health systems, and of how to inform best practice. 
Looking across settings involves adopting a pluralistic 
perspective, which allows for greater variation in processes of 
evidence synthesis, verification and communication. Doing 
so will help to support further critical scrutiny on research 
ethics, quality, interpretation and uptake, and ultimately 
higher ethical accountability of policy-makers.49
A growing number of papers synthesizing evidence across 
similar settings is a valuable step forward in this regard.1-8 We 
argue that, beyond the value of learning across disciplines 
and programmes,9 we can gain even more by breaking out 
geographic silos and looking at lessons learnt from across 
low- and middle- and high-income settings. Given similarities 
and differences that we highlighted, a few examples emerge. 
Research on the design of programmes and how design and 
context affect impact is of global relevance and can only be 
undertaken by looking across settings. More analysis of 
spillovers and heterogeneous effects may be done in LMIC 
using methods and frameworks applied in HIC. On the other 
hand, there is room to extend the analysis of mechanisms and 
health system effects, which is already growing in LMIC. As 
routine data systems improve in LMIC they can be used to 
perform the type of analyses already performed in HIC, and 
similarly HIC researchers may consider ideas for primary 
research in LMIC settings.
Concrete steps may be undertaken at the structural level 
by international organizations, such as the World Health 
Organization (WHO) working on the political economy of 
health financing reforms.50 The WHO could create forums 
for discussion and opportunities for comparative research, as 
well as promote the use of overarching frameworks that may 
facilitate comparisons and information exchange. Academic 
journals could also systematically encourage efforts to bridge 
the gaps across research communities. For example they 
could encourage reviews to consider global rather than a 
geographic subset of the literature and examine the relevance 
of context to the findings and require for studies reporting 
new evidence a discussion of how research design, methods, 
data and findings may differ from those in other settings. Such 
initiatives, may also further contribute to promote evidence 
based policy-making, increase research quality and prevent 
conflict of interests.
Despite the obvious contextual differences of doing health 
policy research in different income settings, the focus on 
common themes and research insights emerging from 
these different settings will undoubtedly lead to a fuller 
understanding of the topic we share a research interest in and 
improve our research practice. Concrete steps may also be 
taken by individual researchers by looking from HIC to LMIC 
and vice versa, in addition to comparing findings with those 
from similar economic setting. We invite more researchers to 
join us in this endeavour. 
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